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1. Introduction 
Dividend policy has been an area of intense research in corporate finance, with 
theoretical and empirical analysis showing that firms follow well considered payout 
strategies (e.g. Fama and French 2001, Banerjee et al. 2007). Within this literature, the 
role of dividend policy dealing with asymmetric information and agency conflicts 
between corporate insiders and outsiders has received a great deal of attention. The 
payment of dividends decreases the level of funds available for perquisite consumption 
and investment opportunities and requires insiders to seek financing in capital markets. 
Dividend payouts can therefore be used as a control mechanism by outside shareholders 
to prevent entrenchment or empire-building (e.g. Easterbrook 1984, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, and Zwiebel 1996).  
While there is an extensive literature analyzing whether dividend policy is used as a 
corporate mechanism to reduce agency conflict in the case of non-financial firms, few 
empirical papers analyze this issue for financial firms, despite its regulatory relevance. 
This issue is of particular interest because the distribution of earnings as dividends 
obviously reduces banks’ ability to generate capital internally, and then transfers default 
risk to their creditors and deposit insurer (Acharya et al. 2009, 2013). Moreover, banks 
distributed large scale dividend payouts during the 2007-2008 financial crisis despite 
widely unanticipated losses, shedding light on the severe malfunctioning of banks 
corporate governance mechanisms. In this context, the objective of this paper is to 
empirically examine whether dividend payments are used by banks’ insiders as a 
corporate mechanism, allowing for different agency conflicts and different levels of 
asymmetric information.  
As pointed out in La Porta et al. (1998), the level of ownership concentration is a key 
determinant of the nature of agency conflicts between the different firm stakeholders. 
In the U.S., the United-Kingdom, Canada and Australia where the ownership is 
dispersed, the main corporate governance problem is the misalignment of shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests. When the ownership is concentrated, as is prevalent in 
continental Europe and Asia, the conflict of interest shifts away from manager vs. 
shareholders to majority vs. minority shareholders, as large shareholders have 
incentives to maximize their own benefits at the cost of other shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). In both cases, dividend payouts can be used to create shareholder value 
by reducing free cash flow that can be spent by insiders (managers or majority 
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shareholders) on value-decreasing projects (Lang and Litzenberger 1989, Chae et al 
2009). Higher dividend payouts can then signal that insiders will refrain from 
expropriation (signaling behavior). Such signaling behavior can be of importance as the 
potential expropriation of outside investors can be costly to insiders in terms of higher 
equity financing costs (e.g. Chen et al. 2009, Chu et al. 2014) and lower firm valuation 
and returns (e.g. Claessens et al. 2002, Lins 2003, Lemmon and Lins 2003). On the 
other hand, insiders might have incentives to only pay small dividends in order to 
increase the amount of free cash flow they can divert for their private consumption 
(entrenchment behavior) (Gomes 2000). The intensity of the agency conflict between 
insiders and outsiders may be stronger in the presence of concentrated ownership 
(Davies 2000, Sáez and Riaño 2013). Indeed, in dispersed ownership, different 
corporate governance mechanisms can be put into place to give top managers strong 
incentives to discourage entrenchment behaviors, such as, compensation mechanism, 
dismissal threats or the threat of a hostile takeover. These different corporate 
mechanisms aiming to rein in managers’ behavior are much less relevant when the 
ownership structure is concentrated, as large investors can elect their representative(s) 
to the board of directors who will appoint a manager that will act in the interest of these 
controlling shareholders. 
The empirical literature analysing the effectiveness of dividend policy to reduce agency 
conflicts when there is dispersed ownership structure provides mixed results. Some 
studies on non-financial firms find that dividends are used by managers to communicate 
information to shareholders when there is a conflict of interest (e.g. Healy and Palepu 
1988, Denis et al. 1994, and Yoon and Starks 1995), whereas other studies do not 
observe evidence that dividends are used as a signaling device (e.g. Benartzi et al. 1997, 
and Li and Zhao 2008). Empirical studies dedicated to the banking industry, mostly on 
U.S. bank holding companies, find evidence that dividends are used as a signaling 
mechanism (Filbeck and Mullineaux 1993, Bessler and Nohel 1996, Filbeck and 
Mullineaux 1999, Dickens et al. 2002, Theis and Dutta 2009, and Abreu and 
Gulamhussen 2013). In contrast, Galiakhmetova et al. (2015) find, for a sample a 
European listed banks, a negative relationship between CEO power and dividend 
payments, indicating that entrenched CEOs do not have incentives to increase payout 
ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. 
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Even if the intensity of the agency conflict may be stronger when insiders are 
controlling shareholders (instead of managers), the empirical literature analyzing the 
impact of a concentrated ownership on dividend policy is scarcer and provides mixed 
results. Bøhren et al. (2012) and De Cesari (2012) find that higher dividends are paid 
in non-financial firms when the agency conflict between large and small owners is 
stronger, consistent with signaling behavior. However, Faccio et al. (2001) and Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003) find that dividends are higher in non-financial firms with the 
presence of multiple large shareholders; the other large shareholders impede the 
controlling shareholder's expropriation of minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) 
further find that this happens only to firms located in countries with better protection 
of minority shareholders, as asset diversion is legally riskier and more expensive in 
such countries, thereby raising the relative incentives of large shareholders to grant 
dividends to minority shareholders.  
Despite the importance of the degree of asymmetric information faced by outsiders to 
explain the intensity of the agency conflict with either managers or majority 
shareholders, only few studies examine the relationship between the level of 
asymmetric information and dividend policy. The empirical results on the effects of 
asymmetric information on dividends are mixed, focusing only on listed non-financial 
firms which have generally a dispersed ownership structure. While Li and Zhao (2008) 
and Leary and Michaely (2011) find that U.S. firms with higher levels of asymmetric 
information distribute lower dividends, Von Eije and Meggison (2008) find in contrast 
that European firms with higher asymmetric information pay higher dividends. 
Brockman and Unlu (2011) further find a U-shaped relationship between dividend 
payments and disclosure quality. 
Our paper complement the existing literature by exploring further the linkages between 
asymmetry of information, corporate governance and dividend payout decisions for the 
banking industry. We examine if agency conflicts between stakeholders influence 
banks’ dividend policy differently depending on the level of asymmetric information 
faced by stakeholders and the ownership structure (dispersed vs. concentrated). We use 
for that a panel of listed and non-listed European commercial banks over the 2004-2012 
period, with heterogeneity in term of agency conflicts. While the influence of 
asymmetric information on dividend payouts is of particular importance for banks as 
their financial structure combined with high leverage makes them inherently more 
5 
 
opaque than other firms (Morgan 2002), this aspect has not been explicitly taken into 
account in existing studies. Whether the dividend policy can help to alleviate agency 
problems between insiders and outsiders is not a clear cut issue when outsiders are 
confronted with a high level of asymmetric information. One could argue that in the 
presence of high opacity, it might be much easier for insiders, both managers and 
majority shareholders, to extract private benefits of their control. In the presence of 
such entrenchment behavior, we could then expect a stronger contraction of dividends 
as the level of opacity increases. However, if insiders want to signal to outsiders that 
they will not be expropriated, we expect banks to distribute higher dividends with 
dividends increasing with the level of opacity faced by investors. We test if these two 
alternative hypotheses of entrenchment or signaling behavior depend on who is 
involved in managerial decisions, i.e. managers in a dispersed ownership structure and 
majority shareholders in a more concentrated ownership. We further examine if the 
institutional and regulatory environment, more specifically the level of shareholder 
protection and supervisory actions, can constrain any opportunistic entrenchment 
behavior. Our period of investigation also allows us to determine whether banks’ payout 
behavior is different in normal times and during the financial crisis period.  
We find that European banks with either a concentrated or a dispersed ownership 
structure pay lower dividends when they present high degrees of opacity. These results 
would be consistent with the entrenchment behavior for banks, with insiders (either 
managers or majority shareholders) paying lower dividends to extract higher levels of 
private benefits when outsiders face higher degrees of asymmetric information as it 
might be more difficult to detect such opportunistic behavior. We find that this 
entrenchment behavior is observed before and during the crisis period; higher levels of 
shareholder protection help to constrain it but only when insiders are majority 
shareholders, whereas stronger supervisory regimes contribute to moderate the 
entrenchment behavior of both managers and majority shareholders. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. We contribute to the 
literature exploring the determinants of dividend policy by analyzing if the levels of 
asymmetric information combined with different ownership structures influence the 
dividend payout policy. We also add to the literature investigating the dividend payout 
decisions of banks. Few empirical papers analyze the determinants of dividend policy 
of banks, while the Federal Reserve Board (FRB 2011) and the Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision (BCBS 2011) have been emphasizing the necessity to increase 
oversight of banks’ dividend payouts. Indeed, as pointed out by Abreu and 
Gulamhussen (2013), while imposing constraints on bank dividend payments may 
reduce equity-debt agency conflicts and avoid wealth transfer from debt to equity-
holders, it may also reduce the ability of banks to signal their future growth perspectives 
to investors. We also highlight that such constraints on dividend payments might 
facilitate insiders’ entrenchment behavior when stakeholders face high levels of 
asymmetric information. By analyzing the relationship between the degree of opacity 
and dividend payouts for different levels of ownership concentration, using detailed 
bank level data especially on their ownership structure, and examining a wider dataset 
containing both listed and unlisted banks, we further aim to obtain a better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms at work. For this we focus on a European 
dataset which provides a substantial amount of variability between individual levels of 
ownership concentration given the lack of regulatory limitations on the percentage of 
bank capital owned by a single entity in Europe. 
Section 2 describes our sample, the ownership characterization and the measures of 
opacity used. Section 3 presents our methodology. Section 4 discusses our main results. 
Section 5 tests the robustness of those results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Data and variable construction 
2.1. Sample 
Our sample covers listed and non-listed commercial banks from 15 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Our 
data set covers the period 2004–2012. We extracted bank financial statement data from 
BvD Bankscope. We consider consolidated data but also use unconsolidated data when 
consolidated balance sheets are not available. All the banks in our sample publish their 
annual financial statements at the end of the calendar year. As for the ownership 
structure of banks, we compute time-varying variables by combining data from several 
sources, i.e. BvD Bankscope, Thomson Reuters Advanced Analytics and hand-
collected annual reports, in order to obtain information as complete as possible.  
BvD Bankscope provides financial statement data for 1,062 active European 
commercial banks for at least some of the period considered. We limit our sample to 
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European commercial banks which provide information on our variables of interest and 
we clean the data by dropping the lowest and highest 1% observations. We further apply 
specific cleaning criteria for the variable measuring the dividend payout ratio, defined 
as total dividends paid related to the period divided by net income.1 We check if there 
are banks that have non-positive earnings but still pay dividends. We find 96 
observations for which banks have negative earnings, with 42 among them that pay 
dividends.2 We also have 16 observations for which banks have zero earnings, with 4 
that still pay dividends. We drop the 46 observations in our data cleaning corresponding 
to banks with non-positive earnings which pay dividends, to avoid negative dividends 
and infinite numbers. 
We end up with a final sample of 1,150 annual observations corresponding to 330 
European commercial banks (see Table 1 for a breakdown by country). Table 2 presents 
some general descriptive statistics for both our data set and the corresponding full 
sample of banks available under BvD Bankscope. The median data coverage of our 
sample, as measured in percent of total assets in the wider BvD Bankscope one, lies at 
almost 54%, with very similar bank activity characteristics between the two (see Table 
1).  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
2.2. Ownership measures 
To classify banks according to the level of concentration of their ownership structure, 
we follow Bouvatier et al. (2014) and use a hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
(HAC) approach to account more accurately for several dimensions of banks’ 
ownership characteristics. Three ownership measures are considered to identify banks 
which have similar characteristics in the construction of different clusters: the 
                                                          
1 We do not include preferred dividends because we argue that unlike common dividends, payouts for 
preferred stocks are hardly similar to common dividend payout decisions where the payout is fixed. Thus, 
the controlling shareholder cannot influence the decision of preferred dividend payments. The only 
decision that could be influenced is whether to issue preferred stocks or not in the first place. 
Consequently, for example, assuming that most of preferred stocks are cumulative, the controlling 
shareholder may be able to expropriate the other shareholders by not paying dividends, but they cannot 
do it to preferred shareholders. There are only 21 observations in our sample that have share repurchase. 
Including share repurchase do not change our results. 
2 We have 21 banks that paid dividends while having negative earnings during the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 (among them Royal Bank of Scotland, Loyds Bank and Credit Agricole), while only 3 banks 
paid dividends with negative earnings before 2007.  
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percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (Share1ij,t), the percentage of shares 
held by the second-largest shareholder (Share2ij,t),
3 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (Concentrationij).
4 The first two measures give information on the presence of 
one or two large shareholders, and the Herfindahl index captures the concentration of 
the ownership. The HAC uses Euclidean distance to compute similarity between two 
banks. The Ward method is used to determine the distance between clusters consisting 
of several banks (see Appendix A in Bouvatier et al. 2014 for more details). We obtain 
three distinct bank clusters, labelled Cluster 1, 2 and 3. Banks can change cluster over 
time if their ownership structure changes accordingly. 89 banks belong to Cluster 1, 
119 banks to Cluster 2 and 187 to Cluster 3 at some point in time amongst the 330 banks 
in our sample, with 65 banks that change between clusters during the sample period. 
General descriptive statistics for banks in these clusters are provided in Table 2, and 
Table 3 provides statistics for the ownership measures for each of the three clusters.  
With the largest and the second largest shareholder holding on average respectively 
15.71% and 10.45% of the shares, banks in Cluster 1 (dispersed ownership) are 
characterized by a dispersed ownership structure with a large number of shareholders 
that do not hold controlling shares (see Table 3). We assume that the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders is highest in this cluster as there is a separation 
between ownership and control. Banks in Cluster 2 (concentrated ownership) have a 
concentrated ownership structure with either one shareholder or two shareholders that 
hold a controlling stake (for a control threshold of 50%), and some smaller 
shareholders. Banks in Cluster 3 (highly concentrated ownership) display a very strong 
level of ownership concentration. The controlling shareholder holds on average around 
98.5% of the shares, with other shareholders holding a corresponding small percentage. 
Hence, in Clusters 2 and 3, the conflict of interest is between majority and minority 
owners.  
                                                          
3 We alternatively use the ratio of the shares held by the second largest shareholder to those held by the 
largest shareholder (Share2ij,t/Share1ij,t) instead of Share2ij,t to construct our clusters. This ratio measures 
the relative power of the second largest shareholder compared to the largest shareholder, with the highest 
value implying comparable size between the controlling stakes of the two largest shareholders. The 
classification of banks are very similar when we use either (Share2/Share1) or Share2. 
4 We compute for each bank i the variable OSi, defined by the ratio of the percentage of equity held by 
each shareholder n to the total percentage of equity held by all shareholders; we then compute 
Concentration as ∑ 𝑂𝑆𝑛
2𝑁
𝑛=1  with N the total number of shareholders. The higher the Herfindahl index, 
the higher the concentration of bank ownership. 
9 
 
We build on this classification to construct our ownership structure variables. We 
compute the dummy variables Cki,t that takes the value of one if the bank i is in Cluster 
k for the year t and zero otherwise, with k={1,2,3}.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
2.3. Opacity measures 
We define opacity as information asymmetry between more or less informed 
stakeholders. We build on the existing literature to compute a composite index based 
on proxies that capture four components of opacity.  
Our first information asymmetry component (EFij,t) measures the disconnection 
between insiders’ and outsiders’ information about firms’ financial condition. A firm’s 
information opacity is expected to affect the properties of financial analysts’ forecasts, 
with higher analyst earnings forecast error and dispersion in analyst forecasts (e.g., 
Krishnaswani and Subramaniam 1999, Diether et al. 2002). We build an earnings 
prediction model based on publicly available information and use the residual of the 
regression as a measure of insiders’ private information, following Park (1999) and 
Crouzille et al. (2004) (see Appendix 2 for more details). The higher the forecast error 
EFij,t, the higher is the opacity.  
Our second information asymmetry component (EMij,t) is related to the opacity of 
financial statements. A decrease in the quality of financial statements is likely to widen 
the asymmetric information about firm financial position between insiders and 
outsiders. Since Dechow and Dichev (2002), the accepted view is that insiders’ 
discretion influences accrual quality and reduces the information that outside investors 
can collect from financial statements. Moreover, insiders can hide their self-serving 
behaviors through earnings management (e.g. Leuz et al. 2003, Cornett et al. 2009, 
Bouvatier et al. 2014). Accounting numbers no longer reflect the economic reality of 
underlying risk conditions in this case and it is difficult for outsiders to accurately assess 
the fundamental value of the bank. We follow Hutton et al. (2009) and Lang and Maffett 
(2011) and use the degree of earnings management as a measure of accounting opacity. 
Previous studies regarding earnings management at banks measure it via loan loss 
provisions because these are relatively large accruals and therefore have a significant 
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impact on banks’ earnings (Ahmed et al. 1999).5 We use a similar approach to 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) to measure the discretionary element of loan loss 
provisions that are used for earnings management (see Appendix 2 for more details). 
The higher the earnings management EMij,t, the higher is the opacity.  
Our third information asymmetry component is the negative of the ratio of short term 
and long term market funding to total assets (MFij,t), which shows the degree of banks’ 
exposure to the market. When banks have greater exposure to the market, there will be 
more market participants to assess the fair value of the bank, thus reducing asymmetric 
information. The proportion of market funding on the liability side of the balance-sheet 
is considered as a signal for outsiders of lower opacity (Crouzille et al. 2004). The 
higher MFij,t (lower market funding), the higher is the opacity.  
Our last information asymmetry component is the proportion of loans in total assets 
(Loanij,t). Theoretical analyses all lead to the same conclusion that bank loans are 
opaque (e.g., Campbell and Kracaw 1980, Berlin and Loeys 1988, Diamond 1991). 
These theories show that bank loans are unusually difficult for outside investors to value 
as insiders have privileged information about the characteristics of the loan contracts 
and the creditworthiness of the borrowers.6 The higher the loan proportion, the higher 
is the opacity. 
We use the four variables EFij,t, EMij,t, MFij,t, and Loanij,t to construct our opacity 
composite index (Opacityij,t). We check that the four components of our composite 
index capture different dimensions of information asymmetry. The low correlations 
among the variables EFij,t, EMij,t, MFij,t and Loanij,t show that this is the case (see Table 
A1 in Appendix 1). We associate the four components EFij,t, EMij,t, MFij,t and Loanij,t, 
with the value of one for the first decile, the value of two for the second decile and so 
on. We then sum these four proxies and we divide it by four to scale our composite 
index Opacityij,t. It ranges in principle from one to ten, with the highest value 
representing the highest level of opacity that outsiders can face. This index provides a 
                                                          
5 Earnings management could also be measured by discretionary realizations of security gain or losses 
(Cornett et al. 2009). However, the net gain on securities only represents around 4% of the total operating 
income in our sample for European commercial banks, leaving little scope for earnings management.  
6 Trading assets also represent an important source of opacity for banks (Morgan 2002). However, in our 
sample, trading assets are concentrated primarily at the largest banks. On average, less than 1.14 percent 
of assets are held as trading assets, whereas loans represent on average around 56 percent of the total 
assets and are therefore the primary assets for most banks.  
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robust measure of opacity because it averages across several measures of asymmetric 
information. For our sample of European commercial banks, the index has a mean of 
5.62 and ranges from 2.25 to 9.25 (see Table 4). The opacity composite index is 
significantly higher in Cluster 2 compared to Cluster 3, but not compared to Cluster 1.7  
We compute the dummy variable High Opacityij,t, that takes the value of one if the 
index Opacityij,t of a bank is greater than the sample median value and zero otherwise, 
to differentiate banks which have a relatively high and low degree of opacity.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
3.   Specifications and hypotheses tested 
3.1.   Baseline specification 
We first investigate whether the decision of insiders to pay dividends depends on the 
interconnection between the degree of opacity faced by outsiders and the level of 
ownership concentration. For that, we estimate the following equation  
 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3
k=1
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑘=1
 
           + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡
10
k=1
+ 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                      (1) 
where i, j, t stand respectively for bank, country and time. 
The dividend payout (DPij,t) is defined as total dividends paid related to the period 
divided by net income. The dividend to earnings ratio is the most commonly used 
measure of dividend payouts as it captures the key element of the payout policy (La 
Porta et al. 2000, Fidrmuc and Jacob 2010). We include the three cluster dummy 
variables altogether instead of considering a reference category (we then drop the 
constant). We also include interaction terms between the Cluster dummy variables Ckij,t 
and the dummy variable High Opacityij,t. The dividend payouts of banks in Cluster k 
with a low degree of opacity is given by (𝛾𝑘), while those of banks with a relatively 
high degree of opacity is given by (𝛾𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘). 
We test two alternative hypotheses. If insiders signal their unwillingness to extract 
private benefits when the opacity is relatively high by granting dividends to outsiders 
                                                          
7 Mean tests are available on request.  
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(signaling hypothesis), we expect 𝛿𝑘 to be significantly positive. If alternatively 
insiders decide to decrease dividends as it increases the funds at their discretion when 
the opacity is relatively high (entrenchment hypothesis), we expect 𝛿𝑘  to be 
significantly negative. We further test if, for the same degree of opacity, the dividend 
payout ratio is increasing or decreasing with the level of ownership concentration. If 
we follow Davies (2000) and Sáez and Riaño (2013), we would expect that agency 
conflicts are stronger in concentrated ownership than in dispersed ownership. We 
would then observe either an increase of dividends between clusters if insiders in a 
more concentrated ownership want to signal their unwillingness to expropriate 
outsiders, or on the contrary, a decrease of dividends if they use their controlling power 
to increase funds they have at their discretion.   
We build on the existing literature and include control variables that might have an 
impact on the dividend policy of firms. Size, profitability and growth opportunities are 
important determinants of dividend payout ratios of non-financial firms (e.g. La Porta 
et al. 2000, Fama and French 2001, and Von Eije and Megginson 2008). We measure 
bank size (Sizeij,t) through the natural logarithm of total assets and use the return on 
asset (ROAij,t) to measure the profitability. We expect large and more profitable banks 
to pay higher dividends. In order to measure investment opportunities, we use the 
growth rate of total assets (Assets Growthij,t) to measure investment opportunities of 
banks. Banks with high growth opportunities are expected to plowback their earnings 
to avoid costly equity and debt financing. We further include the dummy variable 
M&Aij,t that identifies banks which were involved in operations of acquisition during 
our period of analysis, as the dividend policy should be reviewed to reflect the dividend 
policy of the combined entity and satisfy both acquirer and target firm shareholders.8 
We also control for macroeconomic condition differences across countries by including 
the GDP growth rate (GDP growthj,t).  
The banking literature suggests that other variables might have an impact on banks’ 
dividend payouts. Onali (2014) finds that banks having higher default risk have higher 
payout ratios. We use a time-varying Z-score based on 3-year rolling windows to proxy 
                                                          
8 We use the database Thomson Reuters Advanced Analytics to identify mergers and acquisitions 
involving European commercial banks. 
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bank default risk.9 We follow Lepetit and Strobel (2015) and use its natural logarithm 
in our specifications (Ln Zscoreij,t). Acharya et al. (2011) show that the optimal dividend 
policy also depends on the bank's franchise value. In line with this theoretical finding, 
Onali (2014) shows that the bank charter value has a negative impact on dividend 
payouts. Banks with higher charter have an incentive to pay lower dividends in order 
to preserve the charter. We use the ratio customer deposits to total assets (Depositij,t) to 
proxy the charter value based on the banking literature showing that customer deposits 
contribute to a bank’s charter value (e.g. James 1991, Goyal 2005). We compute the 
dummy variable High Charterij,t that takes the value one if the ratio customer deposits 
to total assets is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. We further control 
for the level of capitalization by introducing the dummy variable High Capitalizedij,t 
that takes the value of one if the previous year’s risk-weighted capital ratio is larger 
than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Banks with lower regulatory capital ratios 
are expected to have lower dividend payouts than well-capitalized banks, as dividends 
paid affect the ability of banks to build a solid capital buffer (Acharya et al. 2011, Onali 
2014). As our period of analysis includes the financial crisis period of 2007-2008, we 
also control for banks that were in distress during this period by including the dummy 
variable Distressij,t equal to one if a bank was in distress, and zero otherwise.
10 We 
expect these banks to distribute fewer dividends due to financial constraints.  
Finally, we consider an index measuring the level of minority shareholder protection 
for each country (Protectj). We follow Rossi and Volpi (2004) and Hagendorff et al. 
(2008) and compute an index of shareholder protection that combines an index 
measuring the level of shareholder rights (revised anti-director index of Djankov et al. 
(2008)) and an index measuring the quality of law enforcement (the rule of law index 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)). The anti-director index 
measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers 
or majority shareholders in the corporate decision making process, including the voting 
process; it ranges from from 0 to 5. The rule of law index reflects perceptions of the 
                                                          
9 The Zscore is defined as: (MROA(3) ijt + ETAij,t)/ SDROA(3)ij,t, where MROA(3)ij,t and SDROA(3)ij,t are 
the moving average and standard deviation of return on assets (with a window width of 3), and ETAij,t is 
the equity to total assets ratio at the date t. Higher Z-score means lower probability of default. 
10 A bank is classified as in “distress” over the period 2008-2012 if it bankrupted, received financial 
support from the government, or was absorbed by another bank due to financial difficulties. We have 19 
banks in distress in our sample (out of 65 distress banks identified in the largest sample of BvD 
Bankscope). Only one of these 19 distress banks distributed dividends when having negative earnings.  
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extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts; 
it ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.11 The index Protectj is defined as the revised anti-director 
rights index multiplied by the rule of law index, and ranges from 0.7 to 8.84, with a 
higher index indicating a higher level of shareholder protection. We compute the 
dummy variable High Protectj that takes the value of one if the level of shareholder 
protection for the country j is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. A 
positive relationship between High Protectj and dividend payouts is expected if 
minority shareholders having higher power force insiders to pay more dividends, in line 
with the outcome model proposed by La Porta et al. (2000). On the contrary, a negative 
relationship will support the substitute model of La Porta et al. (2000), where dividends 
are considered as a substitute for legal protection. It means that dividend payouts should 
be higher in countries with lower levels of minority shareholder protection than in 
countries with stronger levels of protection.  
We ensure the absence of multicollinearity problems by computing the correlation 
matrix (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). We test for the presence of endogeneity between 
dividend payouts and the default risk variable Ln Zscoreij,t.. We use the lags of Zscore 
and rule of law as instruments to perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; the results 
show that Ln Zscoreij,t is not endogenous.
12 We also test for the presence of endogeneity 
between dividend payouts and our cluster dummy variables. Indeed, one could argue 
that investors could have incentives to buy shares of banks which pay higher dividends. 
We use as instruments the lagged values of the ownership variable. The results show 
that none of these variables are endogenous. Finally, we also test the potential 
endogeneity of our opacity index by using the lagged values of the opacity index as 
instruments, and we find that there is no endogeneity problem. 13 
 
3.2.   Augmented specifications 
We further analyze whether external factors (FACT) might influence the relationship 
between dividend policy, opacity and ownership structure. More specifically, we 
                                                          
11 We compute the average value of the rule of law index over the period 2004-2012 for each country. It 
is almost time-invariant for our panel of European countries.  
12 The test is available from the authors. 
13 Tests are available from the authors. 
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examine if the institutional and regulatory environment, through the level of 
shareholder protection and the strength of the supervisory regime, is effective in 
shaping insiders’ behavior (signaling or entrenchment). For this, we augment Equation 
(1) with interaction terms between the cluster dummy variables Ckij,t, the dummy 
variable High Opacityij,t and a dummy variable FACT as follows: 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3
k=1
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑘=1
 
               + ∑ 𝜍𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇 +
3
𝑘=1
 ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡
9
k=1
+ 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡        (2) 
We first consider FACT as a dummy variable that differentiates countries with high and 
low levels of shareholder protection, using the dummy variable High Protectj defined 
above. The payout ratios are given by the parameter (𝛾𝑘) for banks with low degrees of 
opacity in countries with low levels of shareholder protection, by (𝛾𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘) for banks 
with high degrees of opacity in countries with low levels of shareholder protection, by 
(𝛾𝑘 + 𝜑𝑘) for banks with low degrees of opacity in countries with high levels of 
shareholder protection, and by (𝛾𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜍𝑘) for banks high degrees of opacity 
in countries with high levels of shareholder protection. 
Our aim is to examine whether the level of shareholder protection can influence the 
way European commercial banks determine their dividend policy in a context of agency 
conflict and information asymmetry.  On the one hand, if our results are consistent with 
the entrenchment hypothesis, payout ratios of banks with higher degrees of opacity will 
be lower than the ones of banks with lower degrees of opacity. We expect that a higher 
level of shareholder protection can constraint such opportunistic behavior. In this case, 
payout ratios of banks with higher degrees of opacity located in countries with higher 
levels of shareholder protection should be lower than those in countries with lower 
levels of shareholder protection. On the other hand, if our results support the signaling 
hypothesis, payout ratios of banks with higher degrees of opacity will be higher than 
those with lower degrees of opacity. In this case, the expected impact of the level of 
shareholder protection on banks’ behavior is not a clear cut issue. One might consider 
that the level of shareholder protection will not interfere in the relationship between the 
degree of opacity and payout ratios. However, higher levels of shareholder protection 
might reduce the need for more opaque banks to use dividends to signal to outsiders 
that they will not be expropriated.  
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We alternatively examine whether the strength of supervisory regime has an influence 
on banks’ dividend payouts when outsiders are under asymmetry of information. We 
use the index of supervisory power computed by Bart et al. (2004) to measure 
propensities of regulatory authorities to do on-site examinations in order to make an 
overall assessment of banks to determine their economic condition, and their ability to 
remove and replace managers and directors or to force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure when problems are detected. The index Supervisoryj ranges in 
principle from 0 to 10, with a higher index indicating stronger supervisory strength. In 
our sample, the index has a median of 5 and ranges from 4 to 9. We compute the dummy 
variable Strong Supervisoryj that takes the value of one if the index of supervisory 
regime for the country j is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. We expect 
that stronger supervisory regimes limit the entrenchment behavior of insiders. In this 
case, we should observe no significant differences between payout ratios for banks with 
high and low degrees of opacity in countries with stronger supervisory regimes, 
whereas these differences should be significant in countries with weaker supervisory 
regimes.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Opacity, ownership concentration and dividend policy 
 
The estimation results are given in Table 5. We use panel data regression with random 
effects to estimate Equation (1) as the variable High Protectj is time invariant (column 
1).14 We also run an Equation (1) without the interaction terms between the Cluster 
dummy variables Ckij,t and the dummy variable High Opacityij,t  (column 2). We conduct 
Wald tests to determine whether payout ratios significantly differ across Clusters C1, 
C2 and C3 depending on the degree of opacity. Results are provided in Table 6 
(computed based on estimation results of column 1).  
                                                          
14 As the variable High Protectj is time invariant, we cannot use a fixed-effects model. Moreover, our 
ownership variables display little variation over time. According to Plumper and Troeger (2007), a fixed-
effects model is inefficient in estimating the effect of variables that have such limited within variance. 
This inefficiency might lead to highly unreliable point estimates and may thus cause wrong inferences. 
We therefore decide to use a random-effect model; however, we find similar results when we use the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator.  
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Results in Table 6 show that banks in Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 display significantly lower 
dividends when they have higher degrees of opacity compared to those with lower 
degrees of opacity. These results are in line with an entrenchment behavior either from 
managers (Cluster 1) or from majority shareholders (Cluster 2) when there is a high 
level of asymmetric information. However, we do not find such an entrenchment 
behavior for banks having a highly concentrated ownership structure (Cluster 3), as we 
do not observe significant differences in payout ratios for banks with high and low 
degrees of opacity. This difference of behavior between banks in Cluster 2 and Cluster 
3 could be explained by the specific ownership characteristics of the latter. As 
highlighted in Table 3, majority shareholders of banks in Cluster 3 hold 100% of the 
shares for half of the observations and more than 98% of the shares for 75% of the 
observations. When majority shareholders hold such high levels of shares, they would 
act to maximise shareholders’ wealth and not engage in expropriation of minority 
shareholders who are non-existent (or almost non-existent). Hence, there might be no 
incentives for an entrenchment behavior for banks in Cluster 3. 
We further find that the average of the dividend payout ratio is increasing from Cluster 
1 to 3 for banks with lower degrees of opacity, while we do not find any significant 
differences for banks with higher degrees of opacity.15 It means that dividend payments 
increase with the level of ownership concentration for banks with lower degree of 
opacity. This is consistent with majority shareholders trying to signal their 
unwillingness to use dividends to increase funds at their discretion, as it might be 
expected by minority shareholders, but only in banks where there is a low level of 
asymmetric information and where extraction of private benefit might be therefore 
easier to detect.  
Taking all together, these results suggest that the entrenchment behavior we observe is 
related to higher degree of asymmetric information but not to higher levels of ownership 
concentration. We find that banks with either a dispersed or a concentrated ownership 
(but not highly concentrated) pay lower dividends when they display higher levels of 
information asymmetry compared to those with lower degrees of opacity. Our results 
therefore support the hypothesis of an entrenchment behavior of insiders when 
outsiders face high levels of asymmetric information, independently of the nature of the 
                                                          
15 Wald tests are available on request.  
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conflict of interest, be it either between managers/shareholders or majority 
shareholders/minority shareholders.  
 [Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
4.2 Effects of the institutional and regulatory environment  
 
We now examine whether the institutional and regulatory environment, more 
specifically the level of shareholder protection and the strength of the supervisory 
regime, could impede the entrenchment behavior observed for banks with higher 
degrees of opacity. 
The estimation results, using random effects estimators, are given in the first two 
columns of Table 7. Table 8 and 9 report dividends payout ratios and Wald tests for 
banks with high and low degrees of opacity across clusters, according to the level of 
shareholder protection (Table 8) and the strength of the supervisory regime (Table 9). 
Firstly, we observe from Table 8 (Wald tests in column (a)) that banks belonging to 
Cluster 2 in countries with lower levels of shareholder protection have lower payout 
ratios when they have higher degrees of opacity compared to banks with lower degrees 
of opacity, in line with the entrenchment behavior. However, our results show that such 
opportunistic behavior does not exist in countries with higher levels of shareholder 
protection. This result does not hold for banks with a dispersed ownership (Cluster 1) 
as we find that they pay lower dividends when they are more opaque in countries with 
higher levels of shareholder protection. Our findings therefore show that higher levels 
of shareholder protection help to constraint the entrenchment behavior of majority 
shareholders but not the one of managers when the level of asymmetric information 
faced by outsiders is relatively high.  
Wald tests in row (b) furthermore show that, for the same degree of opacity, banks 
dividend payments are higher in countries with lower levels of shareholder protection. 
This is consistent with the substitute model of La Porta et al. (2000), with dividends 
considered as a substitute for legal protection. 
Secondly, we find for countries with weaker supervisory regimes that banks in Cluster 
1 and Cluster 2 pay lower dividends when they display higher degrees of information 
asymmetry compared to those with lower degrees of opacity, in line with the 
entrenchment behavior (Table 9, column (a)). We do not observe such significant 
differences between dividend payouts for banks located in countries with stronger 
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supervisory regimes. These results are consistent with the entrenchment behavior of 
insiders, managers and majority shareholders, being impeded in countries with stronger 
supervisory regimes. Higher propensities of regulatory authorities to conduct on-site 
examinations, greater ability of regulator to constrain banks’ corporate governance 
when problems are detected help to mitigate insiders’ entrenchment behavior and then 
reduce minority shareholder expropriation. 
 [Insert Tables 7 to 9 here] 
 
4.3 Impact of the 2008 global financial crisis 
We further investigate whether European banks change their dividend policy during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the following sovereign debt crisis. Acharya et al. 
(2011) report that banks in the U.S. and in Europe had been paying out significant 
dividends before the crisis period (2000-2006), but also during the crisis period (2007-
2008). The authors explain the persistence of dividend payments during the crisis period 
by the conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders that leads shareholders 
to prefer immediate payouts when banks are financially distressed. Dividends are then 
paid to shareholders at the expense of debtholders, including regulators and taxpayers 
who fund bailouts. Kanas (2013) also provides evidence that the Prompt Corrective 
Action framework was ineffective in curbing dividend behavior. However, he also 
shows that the introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the increase in 
the deposit insurance cap in 2008 entail the elimination of both effects. Abreu and 
Gulamhussen (2013) find that even U.S. bank holding companies that were 
undercapitalized before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 paid higher dividends, but 
they stop doing so during the financial crisis when regulators pressure was greater.  
In line with this literature, we examine whether European banks have changed their 
dividend policy during the financial crisis compared to the non-crisis period; more 
specifically we aim to address whether banks with high degrees of opacity relax or 
amplify their entrenchment behavior during the crisis period. In order to address this 
issue, we rely on the specification in Equation (2) where the variable FACT now 
represents the dummy variable Crisist, taking the value of one during the financial crisis 
period 2007-2012 and zero otherwise. The estimation results are given in the third 
column of Table 7 and Table 10 provides dividend payout ratios and Wald tests for 
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banks with high and low degrees of opacity across clusters, before and during the 
financial crisis period.  
Our results show that banks in Clusters 1 and 2 do not change their behavior during the 
crisis period compared to the non-crisis period (see Wald tests in Table 10, column (a)). 
For these two clusters, we observe as previously that banks with higher degrees of 
opacity pay fewer dividends than banks with lower degrees of opacity, not just during 
the non-crisis period but also during the crisis period. The persistence of the 
entrenchment behavior of insiders (either managers or majority shareholders) during 
the crisis period indicates that benefits of any private extraction dominate those of 
increasing immediate payments during a period of financial trouble.  
Our findings also confirm the stylized facts of Acharya et al. (2011) that European 
commercial banks do not reduce their dividend payments during the crisis period (see 
Wald tests, row (b)).  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We carry out several additional robustness checks on our empirical results.16  
Firstly, we employ two alternative variables to measure the dividend payout: the ratio 
dividends to equity and the ratio dividends to total assets. The results obtained in Tables 
5 to 10 are robust when we use these two measures as dependent variables.  
Secondly, we use the ratio measuring the relative power of the second-largest 
shareholder compared to the largest shareholder (Share2ij,t/Share1ij,t) instead of the 
shares held by the second-largest shareholder (Share2ij,t) to construct our clusters. We 
rerun our Equations (1) and (2) and we find similar results. 
We then rerun our Equations (1) and (2) by excluding banks that change clusters during 
the sample period; this leaves again our results unchanged. 
We further use the third quartile of the index Opacityij,t and Protectj instead of the 
median of the sample to define the dummy variables High Opacityij,t and High Protectj. 
Our results are unchanged with high levels of shareholder protection that help to 
constraint the opportunistic entrenchment behavior of majority shareholders in banks 
that display high degrees of opacity, while stronger supervisory regimes moderate the 
                                                          
16 The estimation results not included in this section are available on request. 
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opportunistic behavior of both managers and majority shareholders. We also use the 
indices Opacityij,t and Protectj in levels instead of dummy variables and calculate the 
relevant marginal effects, with Opacityij,t and Protectj  evaluated at minimum, median 
and maximum levels. We find similar results when the index Opacityij,t and Protectj  are 
relatively high, i.e. above the median of the sample.  
Finally, we investigate whether the type of the majority shareholder has an impact on 
the dividend policy of banks. The existing literature highlights that dividend payments 
are dependent on the identity of the largest shareholder. Institutional investors as 
majority shareholder have the resources, expertise and incentives to monitor and 
influence dividend payments. Prior empirical studies show that institutional investors 
require firms to pay dividends to enjoy preferential tax treatment, but without 
demanding higher payout ratios (e.g. Grinstein and Michaely 2005, Renneboog and 
Trojanowski 2006). Banking firms are also often credited with having a comparative 
advantage in monitoring firms. In line with this hypothesis, Goergen et al (2005) find 
that firms with banks as major shareholder are more willing to omit dividend payments 
than firms controlled by other types of shareholder. Families as majority shareholders, 
on the other hand, might have stronger incentives to pursue private benefits (Claessens 
et al., 2002). However, prior empirical studies find that dividend payout ratios are 
lowest in firms controlled by individuals or families (e.g. Gugler 2003, Renneboog and 
Trojanowski 2006). This can be linked to reputational effects and controlling families 
caring about the long-term viability of the firm, resulting in higher monitoring of 
managers.  
To investigate the impact of the type of the majority shareholder on dividend payout 
ratios, we follow the BvD Bankscope classification in differentiating between the 
shareholder types. We compute five different dummy variables taking the value of one 
if the majority shareholder is either a bank, an institutional investor, an industrial firm, 
a state, or an individual/family. We put all the remaining categories of shareholders 
(managers, public, foundations, and unnamed shareholders) in the category “others”.17 
In our sample, banks’ dominant shareholders fall predominantly into the categories of 
banks, institutional investors and industrial firms. Dominant shareholdings by the 
government and individuals/families, on the other hand, are much less common in our 
                                                          
17 We do not have enough observations for this to consider them as separate groups. 
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sample. As we only have 9 banks where the majority shareholder is state and 33 banks 
where the majority shareholder is an individual/family, we can only run Equation (1) 
by replacing the cluster dummy variables by the shareholder type dummy variables, but 
we cannot run Equation (2) where we need to further differentiate banks according to 
their degree of opacity. Table A3 in Appendix 1 shows that banks which pay the lowest 
dividends are those where the majority shareholder is an individual or a family. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the incentives for expropriation might be stronger 
for individuals/families as they are more able to efficiently divert benefits to themselves 
(Claessens et al., 2002). The highest dividends are paid when the majority shareholder 
is a bank, in line with the findings of Goergen et al. (2005).  
We then test that are our results are not driven by banks where the dominant shareholder 
is an individual or a family by excluding them. We rerun our Equations (1) and we find 
similar results, with significantly higher payout ratios for banks in Clusters 1 and 2 
having higher degrees of opacity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We empirically examined whether dividend payout decisions of banks depend on the 
degree of asymmetric information faced by their outsiders, and on the level of 
ownership concentration. For this, we built a novel database on listed and non-listed 
European commercial banks for the period 2004–2012 with detailed information on 
banks’ individual ownership structure. We used a clustering approach to distinguish 
between banks with different degrees of ownership concentration. We also constructed 
a synthetic measure of banks’ opacity for listed and non-listed banks based on four 
sources of information asymmetry.  
We find that banks with either a concentrated or a dispersed ownership structure have 
lower payout ratios when they have higher degrees of opacity. These results support the 
entrenchment behavior for banks displaying higher degree of opacity and where 
extraction of private benefit might be therefore more difficult to detect, with insiders 
(either managers or majority shareholders) decreasing dividends to potentially increase 
the amount of free cash flow they can divert for their private consumption. Our results 
therefore support the hypothesis of an entrenchment behavior of insiders, independently 
of the nature of the conflict of interest, be it either between managers/shareholders or 
majority shareholders/minority shareholders.  
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Further analysis shows that a higher level of shareholder protection helps to constrain 
the entrenchment behavior of majority shareholder but not the one of managers. 
However, we find that stronger supervisory regimes where regulatory authorities do on-
site examinations in order to make an overall assessment of banks, contribute to 
moderate the entrenchment behavior of both majority shareholders and managers. We 
also find that banks’ dividend payout decisions are not modified during the crisis period 
compared to the non-crisis period.  
Our results provide therefore robust empirical support for the entrenchment behavior 
for banks with either a concentrated or a dispersed ownership structure when outsiders 
face a relatively high degree of asymmetric information. This is a problem that might 
make it more difficult for banks to raise capital. It is therefore worthwhile to determine 
governance mechanisms that could lead to an optimal dividend policy to protect and 
attract minority shareholders.  
Our findings are in line with the recommendation of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB, 
2011) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2011) of having 
greater oversight over the dividend policy of banks. The reform of Basel 3 suggests 
imposing restrictions on dividends for banks that do not satisfy regulatory solvency 
requirements. However, our findings suggest that such restrictions might have an 
unintended impact by amplifying the entrenchment behavior of banks with high degrees 
of opacity.  
If regulators want to allow signaling and agency mechanisms to function, this requires 
a lessening of information asymmetry by doing on-site examinations and imposing 
more transparency and strict information disclosures. Our findings also suggest that 
existing corporate mechanisms need to be improved to mitigate agency conflicts 
between insiders (managers or majority shareholders) and outsiders. Overall, to arrive 
at more efficient capital markets in Europe, better corporate governance mechanisms 
and increased transparency are called for.  
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Table 1. Distribution of banks by country    
  Full sample of   
 Our sample of  commercial banks  Percent of    
Country commercial banks in Bankscope total assets 
Austria 12 80 56.18 
Belgium 7 38 36.11 
Denmark 34 58 53.31 
Finland 4 10 72.52 
France 53 147 45.45 
Germany 21 151 60.94 
Greece 9 20 61.65 
Ireland 5 18 44.06 
Italy 58 142 54.63 
Luxembourg 36 88 26.79 
Netherlands 12 40 44.45 
Portugal 7 27 41.32 
Spain 18 69 81.54 
Sweden 11 26 72.25 
U.K. 43 148 50.31 
Total 330 1062 Median =  53.31 
Percent of total assets represents the average of total assets of commercial banks in our sample for 
the year 2004-2012 divided by the average of total assets of commercial banks of the full sample of 
banks provided by BvD Bankscope for the year 2004-2012.  
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Table 2. General descriptive statistics, on average over the period 2004-2012    
 Deposit ETA Loan LLP ROA ROE NII Expenses TA DP 
Our sample of commercial banks         
All banks (330 banks, 1,150 observations)         
Mean 53.90 7.02 56.35 0.28 0.86 12.99 40.05 58.10        143,122  46.08 
Std. Dev. 20.05 3.68 23.60 0.43 0.81 9.40 15.95 13.15        404,462  29.71 
Minimum 10.46 0.42 0.40 -6.06 -7.00 -59.04 -26.67 10.00                 50  0 
Maximum 91.97 21.30 94.13 4.14 9.26 77.91 87.50 87.37     3,424,403  100 
Cluster 1 Dispersed ownership (89 banks, 294 observations)      
Mean 51.20 7.20 61.96 0.31 0.85 12.34 38.22 58.32        306,390  32.32 
Std. Dev. 18.54 3.84 17.24 0.43 0.77 6.91 13.10 10.78        650,455  22.48 
Cluster 2 Concentrated ownership (119 banks, 307 observations)     
Mean 51.85 7.83 60.13 0.36 0.80 10.96 37.62 58.91          86,902  46.29 
Std. Dev. 18.35 3.84 24.04 0.37 0.70 8.94 14.36 13.28        288,810  28.71 
Cluster 3 Highly concentrated ownership (187 banks, 549 observations)     
Mean 56.42 6.47 51.15 0.22 0.90 14.50 42.62 57.58          87,429  53.88 
Std. Dev. 21.50 3.39 25.20 0.46 0.88 10.53 17.72 14.20        227,734  30.95 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages, except TA which is in millions of USD): Deposit = deposits/total assets; ETA = total 
equity/total assets; Loan = net loans/total assets; LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets; ROA = net income/total assets; ROE = net income/total 
equity; NII  =  non-interest income/operating profit; Expenses = operating expenses/operating profit; TA = total assets; DP = cash dividend related 
to the period/earnings. 
Clusters 1-3 are determined using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) approach that uses three ownership measures in the construction 
of clusters of banks with "similar" ownership characteristics: the percentage held by the largest shareholder, the percentage held by the second-largest 
shareholder, and a Herfindahl index computed for a bank's ownership distribution. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on ownership measures by cluster, on average over the 
period 2004–2012. 
 Share1 Share2 Share2/Share1 Concentration 
All banks (1,150 observations)    
mean 68.13 8.54 0.27 0.61 
sd 35.25 11.84 0.34 0.39 
min 0.01 0 0 0.00 
p25 42 0 0 0.24 
p50 80 3.32 0.08 0.66 
p75 100 13 0.50 1 
max 100 50 1 1 
Cluster 1 Dispersed ownership (294 observations) 
mean 15.39 10.32 0.65 0.07 
sd 12.86 9.05 0.30 0.08 
min 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
p25 5 4.99 0.42 0.00 
p50 10.16 6.19 0.72 0.02 
p75 25.00 16.48 0.94 0.11 
max 42.18 41.00 1 0.34 
Cluster 2 Concentrated ownership (307 observations)  
mean 62.69 20.18 0.34 0.46 
sd 12.32 13.53 0.26 0.15 
min 43.37 0.01 0.00 0.20 
p25 51.00 8.72 0.13 0.30 
p50 60 19.69 0.30 0.47 
p75 75 28.95 0.50 0.59 
max 85.83 50 1 0.76 
Cluster 3 Highly concentrated ownership (549 observations)  
mean 98.71 0.60 0.01 0.98 
sd 2.65 1.79 0.02 0.05 
min 86.67 0 0 0.75 
p25 98 0 0 0.96 
p50 100 0 0 1 
p75 100 0 0 1 
max 100 10 0.11 1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions: Share1 = percentage held by largest shareholder; Share2 = percentage held 
by second-largest shareholder; Share2/Share1 = relative (voting) power of the second largest 
shareholder compared to the largest shareholder; Concentration= Herfindahl index on bank's 
ownership distribution (we compute for each bank i the variable OSi, defined by the ratio of the 
percentage of equity held by each shareholder n to the total percentage of equity held by all 
shareholders; we then compute Concentration as ∑ 𝑂𝑆𝑛
2𝑁
𝑛=1  with N the total number of 
shareholders).  
Clusters 1-3 are determined using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) approach that 
uses three ownership measures (Share1, Share2 and Concentration) in the construction of clusters 
of banks with "similar" ownership characteristics 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of opacity measures, on average over the period 2004-2012. 
 Opacity EM EF MF Loan 
All banks (1,150 observations)      
Mean 5.62 0.60 0.34 13.80 57.45 
Std. Dev. 1.37 0.70 0.45 14.11 22.91 
Minimum 2.25 -4.86 0 0 0.40 
Maximum 9.25 6.86 6.26 79.61 94.13 
Cluster 1 Dispersed ownership (294 observations)    
Mean 5.44 0.58 0.30 18.46 62.13 
Std. Dev. 1.34 0.76 0.41 15.46 16.34 
Cluster 2 Concentrated ownership (307 observations)   
Mean 5.80 0.62 0.37 14.55 60.12 
Std. Dev. 1.43 0.53 0.57 13.81 23.24 
Cluster 3 Highly concentrated ownership (549 observations) 
Mean 5.62 0.59 0.34 10.94 53.36 
Std. Dev. 1.33 0.74 0.39 12.87 24.99 
Variable definitions: Opacity = composite index of four opacity measures (EF, EM, MF, and Loan as defined in section 
2.3); EM=earnings management; EF=earnings forecast error; MF= the negative value of (long term + short term 
market funding)/total assets; Loan = net loans/total assets, 
Clusters 1-3 are determined using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) approach that uses three ownership 
measures in the construction of clusters of banks with "similar" ownership characteristics: the percentage held by the 
largest shareholder, the percentage held by the second-largest shareholder, and a Herfindahl index computed for a 
bank's ownership distribution. 
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Table 5. Degree of opacity, ownership concentration & dividend policy of European banks for the period 2004-2012. 
Dependent: DP  (Equation 1)  (Equation 1 without interaction terms)  
C1 30.98*** 32.90*** 
 (3.45) (3.19) 
C2 39.05*** 39.97*** 
 (4.46) (3.89) 
C3 40.50*** 44.45*** 
 (4.52) (4.19) 
C1*High Opacity -6.45** - 
 (-2.27)  
C2*High Opacity -8.51*** - 
 (-3.08)  
C3*High Opacity -1.51 - 
 (-0.55)  
Opacity - -6.40** 
  (-2.28) 
High Protect -8.34*** -7.97*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.80) 
ROA 1.88 2.16 
 (1.17) (1.33) 
Assets growth -0.08* -0.08* 
 (-1.72) (-1.65) 
Size -0.38 -0.11 
 (-0.61) (-0.17) 
M & A -3.43 -3.46 
 (-1.26) (-1.28) 
Ln ZScore 4.12*** 4.19*** 
 (4.10) (4.15) 
High Capitalized 3.96* 4.27* 
 (1.78) (1.90) 
High Charter 1.50 2.19 
 (0.57) (0.82) 
Distress -4.71 -4.91 
 (-0.80) (-0.82) 
GDP growth 0.74 0.72 
 (1.24) (1.23) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 1,150 1,150 
No. Banks 330 330 
Variable definitions: Dependent variable: DP = cash dividend related to the period/earnings. Independent variables: C1-C3 = 
clusters dummy variables; Opacity=composite index of four opacity measures (EF, EM, MF, and Loan as defined in section 2.3); 
High Opacity = dummy variable equals one if the opacity composite index of a bank is higher than the sample median; High Protect 
= dummy variable equals one if the index for degree of minority shareholders protection is higher than the sample median; ROA = 
Return on Assets; Assets growth  = annual growth of total assets; size = log of total assets; M&A = dummy variable equals one the 
year a bank acquires another financial institutions; Ln ZScore = log of z score, calculated over 3-year rolling windows; High 
Capitalized = dummy variables equals one if the bank risk-weighted capital ratio at the beginning of the period is larger than 
sample median; High Charter = dummy variable equals one if the ratio of customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample 
median; Distress=dummy variable takes value of one if banks are distressed; GDP growth = annual GDPgrowth. z-statistics are 
in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard error is  adjusted for clustering on bank. 
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Table 6. Dividend payout of banks according to the degree of opacity  
 High Opacity Low Opacity  High - Low Opacity 
C1 24.52*** 30.98*** -6.45** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
C2 30.54*** 39.95*** -8.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
C3 38.98*** 40.50*** -1.51 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) 
Variable definitions: C1-C3 = clusters dummy variables; High Opacity = Banks with high 
opacity, dummy variable equals one if the opacity composite index of a bank is higher than 
the sample median. The coefficient represents the average of dividend payout of each 
clusters on each opacity condition. It is computed form equation 1, where average 
dividend payout for banks with low opacity is the coefficient of Ck (γk) and for banks with 
high opacity is coefficient Ck + Ck*Opacity (γk + δk). P-value are in parentheses, with 
p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. 
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Table 7. Degree of opacity, ownership concentration and dividend policy for different levels of 
shareholder protection and supervisory regime strength, and before/during the crisis period, for 
European commercial banks over the period 2004-2014 (Equation (2)) 
 
 FACT 
Dependent: DP High Protect    Strong  
Supervisory 
Crisis 
C1 32.32*** 27.72*** 25.11*** 
 (3.68) (3.16) (2.82) 
C2 43.97*** 37.92*** 36.78*** 
 (5.33) (4.47) (4.22) 
C3 43.91*** 40.55*** 37.39*** 
 (5.33) (4.73) (4.19) 
C1* High Opacity 0.02 -8.29** -5.48 
 (0.00) (-2.12) (-1.58) 
C2* High Opacity -9.69*** -10.85*** -12.41*** 
 (-2.78) (-3.19) (-3.90) 
C3* High Opacity -0.48 -1.30 -3.23 
 (-0.15) (-0.33) (-1.03) 
C1*FACT -4.68 1.20 2.82 
 (-0.93) (0.24) (0.91) 
C2*FACT -12.48*** -3.43 -1.54 
 (-2.85) (-0.79) (-0.35) 
C3*FACT -7.76** -4.68 0.17 
 (-1.97) (-0.98) (0.04) 
C1* High Opacity *FACT -9.90* 4.88 -1.92 
 (-1.94) (0.89) (-0.53) 
C2* High Opacity *FACT 3.42 7.04 9.00* 
 (0.68) (1.39) (1.71) 
C3* High Opacity *FACT -2.69 0.12 4.90 
 (-0.57) (0.02) (1.10) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 1,150 1,150 1,150 
No. Banks 330 330 330 
Variable definitions: Dependent variable is DP (dividend payouts) = cash dividend related to the period/earnings. 
High Opacity= dummy variable equals one if the opacity composite index is higher than the sample median. 
FACT: High Protect = dummy variable equals one if the index for degree of minority shareholder protection is 
higher than the sample median; Strong Supervisory=dummy variable equals one if the supervisory regime index 
is higher than the sample median; Crisis=dummy variable equals one during the financial crisis period 2007 -
2012. z-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard error is adjusted for 
clustering on bank. 
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Table 8. Wald tests for differences in dividend payout ratios for high vs. low opacity and for different levels of 
shareholder protection (computed from Table 7). 
   Opacity  Difference in 
Coefficient 
   Low High High  - Low Opacity (a) 
  C1 32.32*** 32.34*** 0.02 
 Low C2 43.97*** 34.28*** -9.69*** 
Protect  C3 43.91*** 43.43*** -0.48 
  C1 27.64*** 17.76** -9.88*** 
 High C2 31.49*** 25.22*** -6.27 
  C3 36.15*** 32.98*** -3.17 
Difference in Coefficient   -4.68 -14.58***  
High - Low Protect (b)   -12.48*** -9.06**  
   -7.76** -10.45***  
 p<0.1*, p<0.05**  and  p<0.01***       
Variable definitions: The opacity measure is the opacity composite index (Opacity); Protect is the level of shareholder 
protection. The number in the Table is sum of coefficients from Equation (2), depending on each cluster, the degree of opacity, 
and the level of shareholder protection. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Wald tests for differences in dividend payout ratios for high vs. low opacity and for different levels of 
supervisory strength (computed from table 7). 
   Opacity  Difference in 
Coefficient 
   Low High High  - Low Opacity (a) 
  C1 27.72*** 19.43*** -8.29** 
 Weak C2 37.92*** 27.07*** -10.85*** 
Supervisory  C3 40.55*** 39.25*** -1.3 
  C1 28.92*** 25.51*** -3.41 
 Strong C2 34.49*** 30.68*** -3.81 
  C3 35.87*** 34.69*** -1.18 
Difference in Coefficient  C1 1.2 6.08  
High - Low Protect (b)  C2 -3.43 3.61  
  C3 -4.68 -4.56  
 p<0.1*, p<0.05**  and  p<0.01***       
Variable definitions: The opacity measure is the opacity composite index (Opacity); Supervisory is the level of the supervisory 
regime index. The number in the Table is sum of coefficients from Equation (2), depending on each cluster, the degree of 
opacity, and the strength of supervisory regimes. 
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Table 10. Wald tests for differences in dividend payout for high vs. low opacity in crisis and non crisis time 
(computed from table 7). 
   Opacity   Difference in Coefficient 
   Low High High  - Low Opacity (a) 
  C1 34.93*** 26.49*** -8.44* 
 No C2 44.41*** 29.80*** -14.60*** 
Crisis  C3 42.56*** 39.36*** -2.7 
  C1 28.79*** 23.82*** -4.96* 
 Yes C2 36.27*** 28.88*** -7.39** 
  C3 37.27*** 35.60*** -1.67 
Difference in Coefficient  C1 -6.14 -2.67  
Crisis – no crisis (b)  C2 -8.13 -0.92  
  C3 -5.29 -4.26  
 p<0.1*, p<0.05**  and  p<0.01***       
Variable definitions: The opacity measure is the opacity composite index (Opacity); Crisis is the dummy variable that takes the 
value of one in 2007-2012 and zero otherwise. The number in the Table is sum of coefficients from Equation (2), depending on 
each cluster, the degree of opacity, and the economic condition. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Correlation matrix of opacity measures   
Variables Opacity EM EF MF Loan 
Opacity 1.000     
EM 0.285* 1.000    
EF 0.343* 0.056 1.000   
MF -0.380* -0.135* -0.049 1.000  
Loan 0.373* 0.052 -0.092* 0.301* 1.000 
Variable definitions: Opacity = composite index of opacity measures (EM, EF, MF and Loan); 
EM=earnings management; EF=earnings forecast error; MF= the negative value of (long 
term + short term market funding)/total assets; Loan = net loans/total assets. With p<0.05*. 
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Table A2. Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 C1 1.000
2 C2 -0.349* 1.000
3 C3 -0.553* -0.575* 1.000
4 Opacity -0.079* 0.077* -0.002 1.000
5 Protect 0.142* -0.206* 0.047 0.107* 1.000
6 Supervisory 0.050 -0.243* 0.159* 0.035 0.600* 1.000
7 ROA 0.005 -0.054 0.048 0.489* 0.109* 0.063* 1.000
8 Assets growth 0.086* 0.001 -0.079* 0.092* 0.091* 0.092* 0.120* 1.000
9 Size 0.145* -0.129* -0.016 -0.473* -0.060* 0.058* -0.342* -0.023 1.000
10 M&A 0.175* -0.014 -0.136* -0.174* 0.024 0.082* -0.037 0.078* 0.356* 1.000
11 Ln Z Score -0.010 0.052 -0.032 0.005 -0.013 -0.008 0.056* 0.008 -0.112* -0.008 1.000
12 High Capitalized -0.287* -0.014 0.262* 0.193* 0.182* 0.133* 0.130* -0.137* -0.362* -0.164* -0.045 1.000
13 High Charter -0.106* -0.045 0.128* 0.344* 0.089* -0.000 0.229* -0.022 -0.480* -0.164* -0.002 0.288* 1.000
14 Distress 0.055 -0.017 -0.032 -0.086* -0.073* -0.029 -0.065* -0.036 0.103* 0.132* -0.091* -0.063* -0.021 1.000
15 GDP growth 0.016 -0.074* 0.058* 0.059* 0.182* 0.134* 0.173* 0.179* -0.027 0.006 0.076* 0.012 -0.013 -0.105* 1.000
Variable definitions: C1-C3 = clusters dummy variables; Opacity= composite index of opacity measures (EM, EF, MF and Loan); Protect = Index of degree of minority shareholders protection, which is
Rule of Law index multipied by revised Anti Director index (Djankov et al. 2008); Supervisory=banks supervisory regime index; ROA = Return on Assets; Assets growth = annual growth of total assets;
Size = log of total assets; M&A = dummy variable equals one the year a bank acquires another financial institutions; Ln ZScore = log of z score, calculated over 3-year rolling windows; High
Capitalized = dummy variables equals one if the bank risk-weighted capital ratio at the beginning of the period is larger than sample median; High Charter = dummy variable equals one if the ratio of
customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample median; Distress=dummy variable takes value of one if banks are distressed; GDP growth = annual GDP growth. p<0.05*.
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Table A3. Ownership type and dividend payout of European commercial banks for the period 2004-
2012 
Dependent: DP       
Bank 5.52***      
                                 (2.91)      
Institutional  -0.79     
                                  (-0.30)     
Industrial   -5.47***    
                                   (-2.65)    
State    -9.39   
                                    (-0.75)   
Individual/Family     -8.95**  
                                     (-2.11)  
Others      1.81 
                                      (0.39) 
High Opacity -2.30*** -2.36*** -2.28*** -2.33*** -2.34*** -2.34*** 
                                 (-3.07) (-3.16) (-3.05) (-3.13) (-3.13) (-3.15) 
High Protect -3.35*** -3.55*** -3.51*** -3.58*** -3.50*** -3.57*** 
                                 (-6.93) (-7.20) (-7.23) (-7.29) (-7.18) (-7.25) 
Constant                         69.75*** 74.24*** 73.71*** 73.65*** 74.63*** 73.92*** 
                                 (7.22) (7.79) (7.75) (7.74) (7.82) (7.78) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Observation                            1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 
No. Bank 330 330 330 330 330 330 
R-squared (overall) 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is DP (dividend payouts) = cash dividend related to the 
period/earnings; Bank, Institutional, Industrial, State, Individual/Family  = dummy variable equals one if the largest 
owner is a  bank, an institutional investor, an industrial firm, the state or an individual/family, respectively; Others= 
dummy variable equals one if the largest shareholder is either a manager, the public, a foundation or an unnamed 
shareholders; High Opacity= dummy variable equals one if the opacity composite index is higher than the sample 
median; High Protect = dummy variable equals one if the index for degree of shareholder protection is higher than 
the sample median. z-statistics are in parentheses, with p<0.1*, p<0.05** and p<0.01***. Standard error is 
adjusted for clustering. 
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Appendix 2 
1. Estimation of an earnings prediction model 
The capacity of investors to forecast the profitability of a firm relies on the information 
they have. We assume that the rational prediction of stock markets may be captured by 
the prediction of a well-specified regression model based on publicly available 
information. Under this assumption, a positive residual of the regression means that 
stock markets underestimated banks’ earnings. In this case, the actual earning turns out 
to be larger than the ones predicted by the stock market model. On the contrary, the 
residual of regression is negative when the earning predicted by the stock market is 
larger than the actual earning. In both cases, publicly available information do not 
permit to perfectly forecast the profitability. We follow Park (1999) and Crouzille et al. 
(2004) by considering that the residual of an earnings prediction model can be used as 
a proxy to measure banks private information. We build on an empirical specification 
that is close to those in Crouzille et al. (2004), that we augment with other explanatory 
variables following Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014): 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼0+𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1                                                            (𝐴1) 
 
where ROAij,t is the return on asset of bank i at time t. Expenses is operating expense to 
operating profit that reflects operational efficiency; Depositij,t-1 is customer deposit 
divided by total assets; ETAij,t-1 is the ratio of equity to total assets measuring bank 
liquidity and leverage; Loanij,t-1 is the ratio of net loan to total assets; NIIij,t-1 is the ratio 
of non-interest income to total income, measuring income diversification; Cost of 
Fundi,t is the ratio of interest expenses over total deposits; Dispersionij,t-1 is a measure 
of ownership dispersion; Bank Concentrationj,t-1 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
total assets for each year on each country; ROAIj,t-1  is the average ROA of the banking 
Industry for the whole country for each year; GDPgrowthjt-1 is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product of each country.  
We perform the estimation each year using OLS and we use the absolute value of the 
residual from the regression estimations to generate our measurement for bank opacity 
EF. The asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders should be relatively 
high for a bank i when the absolute value of residual of the regression 𝜀𝑖 is relatively 
high.   
  
2. Degree of earnings management 
We build on an empirical panel specification that is close to those in Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Anandarajan et al. (2007) and 
Bouvatier et al. (2014) to measure the degree of earning management: 
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐿 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                            (𝐴2) 
where LLPij,t is the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets.  
The non-discretionary component represents loan loss provisions made to cover 
expected credit losses. In our specification it is identified by Loanij,t the ratio of net loan 
to total assets, NL growthij,t  the net loan growth, COMij,t  the ratio of commission and 
fee income to total assets and GDPgrowthjt the growth rate of gross domestic product.  
The earnings management results from two different management objectives. Banks 
can use their loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth their income; banks understate 
(overstate) LLP when earnings are expected to be low (high) relative to that of other 
years (inter-temporal smoothing). If banks use LLP to smooth earnings, then we would 
expect a significantly positive relation between earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions ER/TAij,t and LLP. Banks can also use LLP to signal their financial strength. 
If signaling is an important incentive in choosing LLP, then we should observe a 
significantly positive relation between LLP and changes in future earnings before taxes 
and LLP, with SIGNij,t defined as ((ERit+1 − ERit)/0.5(TAi,t + TAi,t+1)). We also control 
for a possible capital management behavior, even if scope for such behavior is more 
limited since Basel 1 and even more so under Basel 2. Banks with low regulatory capital 
could be more inclined to make loan loss provisions to keep their capital ratio adequate. 
To control for such behavior, we include the lagged ratio of equity to total assets (ETA 
ij,t-1). 
We use GMM system estimation to estimate Equation (A2) with forward orthogonal 
deviations transformation of the original equation as suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and the two-step estimator including the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample 
correction. We only instrument the lagged dependent variable and assuming the other 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous.  
Our results show that European commercial banks use their LLP to smooth their 
earnings and signal their financial strength. We then compute our earning management 
variable (EM) as follows: EM ij,t = β6ERij,t + β7SIGNij,t.   
 
 
 
 
